A Relational Approach to Right of Confrontation and its Loss by Tuerkheimer, Deborah




Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue
Article 9
2008
A Relational Approach to Right of Confrontation
and its Loss
Deborah Tuerkheimer
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to Right of Confrontation and its Loss, 15 J. L. & Pol'y (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol15/iss2/9
TUERKHEIMER 6/22/2007 1:12 AM 
 
725 
A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO 
THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION  
AND ITS LOSS 
Deborah Tuerkheimer∗ 
INTRODUCTION  
Battering is fundamentally different from violence between 
non-intimates.1 Domestic violence is widely understood—outside 
the law—as an ongoing pattern of conduct defined by both 
physical and non-physical manifestations of power.2 Yet, by tacit 
                                                          
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; A.B., 
Harvard College, 1992; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. This Article 
condenses and updates the ideas first expressed in Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 
N.C. L. REVIEW 1 (2006). I am grateful to Laurence Busching, Richard 
Friedman, Brooks Holland, Tom Lininger, Lois Lupica, Joan Meier, Robert 
Pitler, Myrna Raeder, Frank Tuerkheimer, Jennifer Wriggins, and Melvyn 
Zarr for their helpful comments on earlier incarnations of this piece, and to 
Judith Lewis for her invaluable research assistance. 
1 Violence between non-intimates is paradigmatic criminal conduct and 
lies in contrast to domestic violence, which, in important respects, lies 
outside the bounds of traditional criminal law structures. For a discussion of 
the features that define “paradigmatic” crime, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize 
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 971-74 (2004) 
[hereinafter Remedying the Harm of Battering]. Although child abuse and 
elder abuse share many of the dynamics distinguishing battering from 
conventional crime, and much of the discussion which follows applies to 
violence in intimate relationships generally, I focus here on adult partner 
abuse and the law’s response to it. 
2 Psychologist Mary Ann Dutton has elaborated on the dynamics of 
domestic violence as follows: 
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default to analogy and precedent, our legal system equates 
domestic violence with paradigmatic non-domestic violence,3 
resulting in an odd disconnect between the law and life outside 
of it. 
This observation is particularly true in the Sixth Amendment 
context, where notions of domestic violence underlying 
contemporary Confrontation Clause jurisprudence are 
sufficiently inaccurate as to fatally undermine the coherence of 
both doctrine and theory.4 As scholars, practitioners, and courts 
struggle to discern the meaning of the Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncement in Davis v. Washington,5 my critique focuses on 
                                                          
Abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events. 
Although a set of discrete abusive incidents can typically be 
identified within an abusive relationship, an understanding of the 
dynamic of power and control within an intimate relationship 
goes beyond these discrete incidents. To negate the impact of the 
time period between discrete episodes of serious violence—a 
time period during which the woman may never know when the 
next incident will occur, and may continue to live with on-going 
psychological abuse—is to fail to recognize what some battered 
woman experience as a continuing “state of siege.” 
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: 
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 
1208 (2003) (quoting Sue Osthoff, Director, National Clearinghouse for the 
Defense of Battered Women). For a more thorough discussion of the nature 
of battering, see Tuerkheimer, Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 
1, at 962-69. 
3 See supra note 1 (explaining term). 
4 The jurisprudence is incoherent insofar as its defining construct cannot 
be applied meaningfully in the domestic violence realm, though it may indeed 
be compatible with paradigmatic crime. The irony is that, as a categorical 
matter, battering prosecutions will most often present the need for trial 
without the testimony of a victim. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers 
After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005) (“[R]ecent evidence 
suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some 
point.”). See also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic 
Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REVIEW 1, 14-18 (2006) 
[hereinafter Crawford’s Triangle] (discussing causes and manifestations of 
victim non-cooperation). If a framework for Confrontation Clause challenges 
fails in these cases, in my view it cannot be seen as adequate. 
5 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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the underlying conceptual framework as inherently flawed. 
The Court has promulgated an invalid test for “testimonial 
statements” by incorporating a model of discrete, episodic 
violence that is incompatible with the ongoing nature of abuse. 
In essence, the Court has defined the term in a manner that does 
not and cannot measure what it purports to in domestic violence 
cases. 
In the discussion which follows, I examine cases and 
commentary treating the right of confrontation in victimless 
domestic violence prosecutions.6 My objective in doing so is to 
expose the assumptions underlying the application of Crawford 
v. Washington7 to the battering sphere. This Article argues that 
the Court has failed to acknowledge the continuing course of 
conduct that characterizes domestic violence. 
A full appreciation of the dynamics of domestic abuse and 
attention to the context of the relationship that embeds victim 
and defendant results in what this Article will refer to as a 
“relational approach” to Confrontation Clause analysis.8 This 
Article develops the relational approach by analyzing the two 
doctrinal questions that will continue to arise most frequently in 
the post-Crawford era: (1) when is a statement testimonial, and 
(2) when has a defendant forfeited his right of confrontation? 
Part I critiques the Davis Court’s definition of “testimonial” 
                                                          
6 Many domestic violence victims become reluctant or unwilling to assist 
with prosecutorial efforts after a batterer’s arrest, creating the need for 
prosecution without reliance on a victim’s testimony, or so-called “victimless 
prosecution.” Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at 2 n.3. I 
use this term advisedly, as it tends to obscure the fact that someone was 
indeed victimized by the conduct at issue in the case, notwithstanding her 
absence from the trial. It seems to me that “victim absent” would be a 
preferable way of describing prosecutions now referred to as “victimless.” 
Nevertheless, to adhere to convention and avoid unnecessary confusion, I will 
continue to use the accepted term. 
7 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
8 My use of the word relational in this context is not derived from the 
scholarly tradition of relational feminism. Rather, it is way of characterizing 
an approach to understanding the Confrontation Clause that views the 
alignment of relationships between accuser, accused, and state as central to 
its descriptive and normative aspirations. See infra Part V. 
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for its complete inattention to the dynamics of battering. This 
Part argues that decontextualized determinations of exigency—
and continued adherence to an inapt dualism—will inevitably 
skew the disposition of Confrontation Clause challenges. In 
evaluating whether a hearsay statement is testimonial, the Court 
has adopted a theoretical framework that posits a binary 
relationship between “crying for help” and “providing 
information” for investigatory purposes.9 
However, in the domestic violence realm, the dichotomy is 
false. By this contention, I mean to suggest more than that 
officers and victims have “mixed motives” that are often 
difficult to discern.10 Rather, from the perspective of battered 
women, the meaning of “exigency”—a construct deeply 
embedded in the now-reigning definition of testimonial—is 
distinct from that experienced by victims of other types of 
crimes.11 In order for the exigency confronting a battered 
woman to be resolved, she must often provide information 
regarding past violence; she does so in order to prevent 
imminent violence. Thus, the two functions conceived of by 
courts (“crying for help” and “providing information”) as 
distinct, and indeed binary, are not only practically inseverable, 
but are conceptually so as well. By failing to account for this 
reality, the dominant judicial approach has resulted, and will 
continue to result, in the classification as “testimonial” of many 
statements by domestic violence victims that are, in fact, cries 
for help in response to immediate danger.  
Part II examines the lower courts’ treatment of the 
testimonial question in Davis’ immediate aftermath in order to 
                                                          
9 See Davis, 126 S. at 2279. 
10 Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a 
report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or 
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of 
the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather 
evidence. Assigning one of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives,’ primacy 
correct word here? requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will 
rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.”) (internal citation omitted). 
11 For a more extended analysis of this proposition, see Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
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illustrate defects in the Court’s framework for classifying 
testimonial hearsay. It must be conceded, however, that even a 
properly contextualized analysis of the definitional question will 
lead to the exclusion of out-of-court statements that, while 
admissible in victimless prosecutions before Crawford, will now 
be properly categorized as testimonial. New attention must 
therefore be given to the rule of forfeiture by misconduct, which 
precludes a defendant from asserting confrontation rights where 
he is responsible for procuring the witness’ absence from trial. 
As the advancement of forfeiture arguments in domestic violence 
cases becomes increasingly commonplace,12 the doctrine—as yet, 
undeveloped in the battering realm—must evolve. 
Part III argues that judicial forfeiture determinations should 
take into account the characteristics that distinguish domestic 
violence from other types of criminal tampering. This Part 
provides a conceptual roadmap for this doctrinal transformation 
suggesting that as courts begin to formulate a forfeiture 
framework applicable to domestic violence cases, reliance on 
precedent and analogy inevitably will subvert the rule’s equitable 
rationale. This Part reveals that the influence of batterers over 
victims departs in important ways from the traditional witness 
tampering paradigm; in most abusive relationships, “tampering” 
conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of power 
that is itself criminal. Without acknowledging the patterned 
nature of domestic abuse, courts cannot correctly interpret the 
meaning of forfeiture. Thus, fidelity to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the doctrine demands new consideration of how 
it applies to victimless domestic violence prosecutions. 
Finally, Part IV offers a theory of how the preceding 
discussion might help to conceptualize the meaning of the 
confrontation right. While undermining the notion that ensuring 
evidence “reliability” is the exclusive function of the right of 
confrontation, Crawford erected no new governing theoretical 
framework. In the face of this void, the need to articulate a 
                                                          
12 The Davis Court’s recent reiteration of the principle of forfeiture and 
its dictum discussing evidentiary standards applicable to forfeiture hearings 
will further accelerate the development of law in this area. See Davis, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2279-80. 
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normative vision of confrontation has never been more 
compelling. This Part suggests that when the realities of 
domestic violence are attended to, a new paradigm for 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence—one that is, in essence, 
relational—can be discerned. Adopting a relational approach to 
confrontation has the potential to transform how we think about 
the value of confrontation in domestic violence prosecutions and 
beyond. 
I.  DAVIS AND THE FALSE PRIMACY OF PAST “EVENTS” 
The conceptual tension that underlies the definition of 
testimonial hearsay derives from an uncritical acceptance of 
what one court expressly termed “the dichotomy between a plea 
of help and testimonial statements.”13 In the domestic violence 
context this dichotomy is false. Often, a battered woman’s safety 
depends entirely on the intervention of law enforcement: she 
                                                          
13 State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wash. 2004). In an important 
article pre-dating Crawford, Richard Friedman and Bridget McCormack 
describe the operative theoretical construct as follows: 
Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding 
police officers. A reasonable person knows she is speaking to 
officialdom—either police officers or agents whose regular 
employment calls on them to pass information on to law 
enforcement, from whom it may go to the prosecutorial 
authorities. The caller’s statements may therefore serve either or 
both of two primary objectives—to gain immediate official 
assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous, 
situation, and to provide information to aid investigation and 
possible prosecution related to that situation. In occasional cases, 
the first objective may dominate—the statement is little more 
than a cry for help—and such statements may be considered 
nontestimonial . . . . The more the statement narrates events, 
rather than merely asking for help, the more likely it is to be 
considered testimonial. 
Richard D. Friedman & Bridge McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1171, 1241-42 (2002). The authors do not limit their discussion to 
the domestic violence context, although much of their attention is directed 
specifically at the problem referred to as “dial-in testimony” of domestic 
violence victims. Id. at 1180-1200. 
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needs police protection because without assistance the violence 
will continue. Put differently, a domestic violence victim’s 
safety may be wholly contingent on her communication with 
police; her “narration of events” linked inexorably to 
resolving—however temporarily—the danger posed by her 
batterer.14 Unlike victims of episodic crimes, a battered woman 
may “cry for help” because it is the only possible way for her to 
experience a moment of safety, however brief. 
The “cry for help” may sound much like a narration of 
events because it is: a victim is describing battering that will, in 
all likelihood, continue in the absence of some action by law 
enforcement.15 From her perspective, if she does not describe 
the crime to the police, it is simply not “over,” nor is she 
safe.16 And even when she does recount the incident, assuming 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
2004); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), judgment vacated, 
126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006). 
15 The ongoing pattern of physical and non-physical conduct that 
characterizes battering is often escalated by a victim’s attempt to increase her 
control over her life. In my experience prosecuting and supervising domestic 
violence cases in the New York County District Attorney’s Office, I found 
this to be especially true of acts triggering the intervention of law 
enforcement. See Martha M. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991) (“[A]t 
the moment of separation or attempted separation—for many women, the first 
encounter with the authority of law—the batterer’s quest for control often 
becomes most acutely violent and potentially lethal.”). Cf. Brief of Amici 
Curiae National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of 
Respondent at 7, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (Nos. 05-
5224 and 05-5705), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 198, at *19 (“Pursuing 
prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the 
abuser’s control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence.”). By 
asserting that violence will likely continue absent some action on the part of 
law enforcement, I do not mean to imply that an arrest will, in all or even 
most cases, bring about a permanent cessation of violence. See infra note 17 
(acknowledging uncertainty regarding deterrent effects of arrest in domestic 
violence cases). Rather, arrest provides battered women with a reprieve, 
however temporary, that is of value for a variety of reasons. 
16 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Network to End Domestic 
Violence, supra note 15, at 48 n.20 (“It is not uncommon for domestic 
abusers to threaten their victims that they will kill them if they call the 
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the police are able to make an arrest, there is every reason to 
believe that⎯after a respite⎯the battering will continue.17 The 
domestic violence victim’s exigency extends beyond what might 
appear to an outside observer⎯or even to the “reasonable 
person” unfamiliar with the culture of this particular battering 
relationship18⎯to be the “end” of the criminal incident. The 
exigency she experiences requires a narration of past events in 
order to resolve the immediate danger they precipitated. This 
reality fatally undermines judicial reasoning predicated on the 
“crying for help” versus “providing information to law 
enforcement” rubric. 
Rather than reject this reasoning, the Supreme Court recently 
reified it in Davis.19 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the 
                                                          
police . . . .”) (citing Director of Milwaukee County District Attorney’s 
Office Domestic Violence Unit). 
17 Domestic violence victims are rarely (if ever) able to predict with 
certainty the impact of law enforcement involvement on future abuse. See 
generally note 15. Indeed, there is considerable controversy regarding the 
deterrent effects of arrest in battering relationships. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, 
Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New 
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994); Eve 
Buzawa & Carl Zuawa, Arrest is No Panacea, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 337 (Gelles & Loseke eds., 1993). See also ELIZABETH 
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184-88 (2000) 
(discussing broader implications of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies). 
 Accepting as a phenomenological matter that a constant danger 
characterizes the lives of many battered women does not mean as a practical 
matter that the period of exigency relevant to the Confrontation Clause 
analysis should be considered to extend indefinitely. As is true of most 
difficult criminal law questions, lines must be drawn. See Deborah W. 
Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 269, 274 (2002) (remarking that “[t]here are many line-drawing 
dilemmas throughout the criminal law”). Ideally, these lines are drawn in a 
manner that corresponds to underlying empirical realities. 
18 After Davis, the focus of judicial inquiry now would seem to be on 
the “circumstances objectively indicating . . . the primary purpose of the 
interrogation,” although “it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, 
not the interrogator’s questions” that remain at the heart of the Confrontation 
Clause. 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
19 See generally id. 
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majority, a statement is nontestimonial if uttered “in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”20 Conversely, if the 
“primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution”⎯i.e., there is “no ongoing emergency”⎯a 
resulting statement is testimonial.21 Where a victim is in need of 
police action to confront the danger presented by her batterer—a 
danger that, given the continuing nature of the violence, is no 
less “exigent” simply because one prosecutable crime has 
already occurred22—the narrative of events necessary to trigger 
law enforcement assistance is classified as testimonial hearsay. 
In this manner, the passage of an “event” essentially 
becomes one proxy for the resolution of exigency. Yet tensions 
within the opinion regarding what counts as an “event” are left 
                                                          
20 Id. at 2273. 
21 Id. Adopting this binary standard, the Court affirmed the state court 
ruling in Davis, holding that the “primary purpose” of the 911 call “was to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”; but it reversed the 
state court holding in Hammon, classifying the challenged statements to the 
responding police officers as “part of an investigation into possibly criminal 
past conduct.” Id. at 2278. By totemically incanting the language of crisis—
“ongoing emergency,” “imminent danger,” “call for help against bona fide 
physical threat,” “present emergency,” “frantic answers,” “environment that 
was not . . . . safe”—the Court purported to differentiate Michelle 
McCrotty’s words from Amy Hammon’s and to justify its definition of the 
latter as testimonial. Id. at 2276-78. Since “Amy’s statements were neither a 
cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to 
end a threatening situation,” id. at 2279, their admission at trial constituted a 
violation of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. 
22 Indeed, given the escalating nature of domestic violence, where one 
crime has just occurred, a victim’s circumstances may be even more 
“exigent.” See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 5-6 (“[a]t the moment of 
separation or attempted separation—for many women, the first encounter with 
the authority of law—the batterer’s quest for control often becomes most 
acutely violent and potentially lethal.”) Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae National 
Network to End Domestic Violence, supra note 15, at *19 (“Pursuing 
prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the 
abuser’s control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence”). 
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unresolved by the majority’s unwillingness to concede that the 
concept is subject to interpretation. The Court leaps to an 
analysis premised on tense—that is, on whether the “event” is 
past or present⎯without pausing to consider what must have 
passed for a statement to be considered testimonial. In this way, 
the Court’s employment of a seemingly neutral term (“event”) 
functions to conceal its outcome-determining effect. The 
assumption that “events” have either happened or “are actually 
happening” obscures the utter subjectivity of this determination, 
begging the question of what qualifies as an “event.” 
If “event” were defined as narrowly as possible—i.e., as the 
infliction of physical injury—it might be possible to identify 
when an event had terminated. While a number of passages in 
the opinion suggest that the Court is flirting with adopting this 
constricted view (by references to “past criminal events” and the 
like), it ultimately concludes—as it must—that “event” must be 
defined more broadly, at the very least, to encompass “a 
threatening situation” or “ongoing emergency.” After all, Davis 
already had left the home moments before McCrotty, the victim, 
described the assault to the 911 operator.23 Yet somehow, the 
Court is able to view her as “speaking about events as they were 
actually happen[ing].”24 
Beyond the ambiguity surrounding the device of “event,” 
Davis rests on the fallacy that exigency can be discerned without 
reference to context.25 The Court’s treatment of Hammon v. 
                                                          
23 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271 (2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 
846 (Wash. 2005). 
24 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. 
25 In contrast, the opinion of Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment 
in Davis and dissenting in Hammon, expressly contemplates the dynamics of 
domestic violence. Consider the following passage: 
[T]he fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. 
Hammon’s past conduct does not foreclose the possibility that 
the primary purpose of his inquiry was to assess whether Mr. 
Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife, requiring 
further police presence or action. It is hardly remarkable that 
Hammon did not act abusively towards his wife in the presence 
of the officers and his good judgment to refrain from criminal 
behavior in the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on 
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Indiana, the consolidated companion case to Davis, is instructive 
in this regard.26 Hammon involved the admissibility of a 
statement made by Amy Hammon to a police officer responding 
to the crime scene. The statement relayed information regarding 
an assault by the victim’s husband. By purporting to differentiate 
Michelle McCrotty’s words from those of Amy Hammon,27 the 
Court justified its definition of the latter as testimonial and the 
former as non-testimonial. In some respects, this result is not 
surprising. After all, Michelle McCrotty is more readily 
analogized to victims of paradigmatic crime:28 Her attacker had 
just recently fled, while Amy Hammon’s was still in the house 
during the police investigation. But this does not mean that 
exigency can only be experienced as it was by Michelle 
McCrotty. Amy Hammon’s story is not unlike those of countless 
battered women unable to communicate with law enforcement 
“about events as they [are] actually happening.”29 Yet the 
                                                          
whether his violence would have resumed had the police left 
without further questioning, transforming what the Court 
dismisses as “past conduct” back into an “ongoing emergency.” 
Id. at 2284-85. 
26 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
27 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79. 
28 Apropos of this observation, the Court’s reference to the 1779 English 
case of King v. Brasier is curious. See id. at 2277. By suggesting that a 
young rape victim’s “screams for aid as she was being chased by her 
assailant” would properly be deemed nontestimonial, the Court seems willing 
to consider the possibility that safety—as opposed to the current infliction of a 
crime—is the relevant construct. What eludes the Court is the extent to which 
the dynamics of domestic violence raise safety concerns that are distinct from 
those presented by paradigmatic crime. A domestic violence victim may, in 
effect, be screaming for aid as she is being functionally chased by her 
assailant; yet provided the physical assault has ended, the Court would 
presumably characterize the statement as one which described past events and 
was, therefore, testimonial. 
29 Id. at 2276. Hershel Hammon apparently broke the telephone during 
his attack on his wife. Id. at 2272. For obvious reasons, it is quite common 
for batterers to destroy or disable the telephone during episodes of acute 
physical violence. Even if a phone is in working order during an attack, it 
should come as no surprise that victims are rarely able to make a call to 911 
in the midst of a beating. 
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Court’s inability (or unwillingness) to contemplate her 
perspective allowed it to proclaim with certainty: “It is entirely 
clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of 
an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct.”30 As “there 
was no emergency in progress”31 (apparently because the 
responding officer “heard no arguments or crashing and saw no 
one throw or break anything”32) and “there was no immediate 
threat”33 once the officers arrived, it was clear to the Court that 
“the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation 
was to investigate a possible crime.”34 And thus, Amy Hammon 
was “cast . . . in the unlikely role of a witness.”35 
The portion of Davis treating Hammon may well be 
criticized for its application of the Court’s newly articulated 
definition of testimonial to the facts. But Amy Hammon could 
not “seek aid” without “telling a story about the past.” (After 
all, the police could do nothing to protect her from her husband 
were Amy simply to have requested assistance because she 
feared him.) My contention, therefore, is that the Court’s test is 
inherently defective.36 By equating the past commission of a 
crime with the resolution of exigency—in essence, by 
propounding the primacy of tense37—the Court negates the 
                                                          





35 See id. at 2277. This language comes from the portion of the opinion 
where the Court, rejecting Davis’ Confrontation Clause challenge, dismisses 
the argument that Michelle McCrotty’s statement was testimonial. Id. The 
Court correctly observes that McCrotty’s “ex parte communication” was not 
“aligned” with “[its] courtroom analogues,” concluding that “[n]o ‘witness’ 
goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.” Id. 
36 See supra note 4. 
37 See, e.g., Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 (“McCrotty’s present-tense 
statements showed immediacy; Amy’s narrative of past events was delivered 
at some remove in time from the danger she described.”). See also supra 
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (critiquing ambiguity surrounding Court’s 
use of “event”). 
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realities of battering.38 
The definition of testimonial embodies assumptions about the 
nature of crime that are false in the battering realm. 
Incorporating a model of discrete, episodic physical violence that 
is incompatible with ongoing, multi-dimensional abuse, the 
Court formulates a standard for classifying testimonial hearsay 
that cannot be truly mapped onto domestic violence cases. Faced 
with the task of implementing a meaningless construct, judges 
are left with only unattractive options. They may grapple with 
the messy truth of ongoing emergencies—thereby confronting the 
inherent unworkability of the standard announced by Davis, and 
the inevitably ad hoc nature of decisions purporting to 
implement it. Alternatively, they may ignore the contextualized 
nature of ongoing emergencies, thereby maintaining the illusion 
of a rule by law (not judges), but at the cost of jurisprudential 
integrity. 
II.  AFTER DAVIS 
It is still too early to predict judicial reaction to the new 
regime. Nevertheless, cases decided in the immediate wake of 
Davis suggest lower court resistance to the Court’s tacit equation 
of battering with other types of crime.39 The decisions treating 
                                                          
38 One way of addressing the problem I am identifying here would be to 
define domestic violence more accurately in the criminal code; that is, to 
criminalize the ongoing, patterned exercise of power and control that is 
battering. I have proposed such a statute, and explained at length the 
limitations of the current criminal law’s incident-based physical injury-
focused response to domestic violence. See generally, Tuerkheimer, 
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 1; Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three 
Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 16-
17, on file with author) (discussing relationship between Court’s recent 6th 
Amendment jurisprudence and proposed substantive criminal law reform). 
39 As of November 17, 2006, approximately 140 lower court decisions 
have cited Davis, although a number of these citations simply reflect remand 
orders, rather than treatment of Davis on the merits. (This figure also does 
not include grant, vacate and remand orders issued by the United States 
Supreme Court.) About a quarter of these cases involve prosecutions for 
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on-scene statements to responding police officers mostly have 
determined that the hearsay is non-testimonial.40 These cases are 
more significant for what their application of Davis reveals 
about the test itself, and the ways in which courts may attempt 
to navigate its failings, than for their outcomes. 
The case of Vinson v. State41 is illustrative of what might be 
seen as a judicial inclination to apply Davis’ test in a manner 
that more adequately accounts for the dynamics of battering than 
does the Davis opinion itself.42 In Vinson, the police responded 
                                                          
domestic violence. See, e.g., State v. Ly, No. A05-1106, 2006 Minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 853 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), State v. Mancini, No. 
A05-1910, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2006), State v. Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 
Tex. App. LEXIS 7036 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006), State v. Rodriguez, 722 
N.W.2d 136 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006). 
40 See, e.g., State v. Ly, No. A05-1106, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 853 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), State v. Mancini, No. A05-
1910, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), 
State v.Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 7036 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006), State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 
136 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006). Interestingly, the designation of 911 calls has 
arisen with less frequency. But see Jackson v. State, 931 So. 2d 1062, 1063 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (classifying with little analysis statement as non-
testimonial since it “described events as they were actually happening”); 
Santacruz v. State, No. 14-05-00227-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7789, at *8 
(Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006) (holding some portions of call deemed 
testimonial, because “there was apparently less, if any, threat of imminent 
danger while the call was being placed” from victim’s mother’s house after 
victim was able to leave crime scene). 
41 No. 01-05-00784-CR, No. 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 
7036, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006). 
42 See also Mancini, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859, at *14 
(“based on [the domestic violence victim’s] emotional state and the informal 
nature of the conversation with the officer, we conclude that a reasonable, 
objective witness would not contemplate that the statements to the responding 
officer would be used in a later trial”); Ly, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
853, at **9-10 (finding statements concededly similar to those defined as 
testimonial in Davis deemed non-testimonial because they were given shortly 
after the police found domestic violence victim bleeding, because officers 
“were still attempting to determine who was involved,” and because she “was 
not cooperating with police”). 
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to the scene “within 10 to 15 minutes” of a 911 hang-up call 
and were told by the victim, who appeared to have recent 
injuries, that she had been assaulted by her boyfriend.43 Soon 
after, the defendant entered the room, where he remained during 
the course of much of the ensuing conversation between the 
police and the victim.44 All of the victim’s statements were 
deemed non-testimonial.45 
With respect to the victim’s initial description of the 
incident, the Vinson court, noting the victim’s “bloodied 
appearance,” and that “the deputy knew that, only minutes 
before, a woman in that same apartment had been yelling for 
police assistance while a man denied that any problem existed,” 
concluded that “the deputy’s asking only what had happened was 
tantamount to his having asked whether an emergency existed or 
whether [the victim] needed assistance.”46 Citing Davis, the 
court emphasized that “[t]he Confrontation Clause does not 
prohibit questioning when, as here, its purpose, viewed 
objectively, is to ascertain if there is an ongoing emergency.”47 
In classifying the deputy’s subsequent questioning of the 
complainant (“the extent and formality of which is not 
revealed”), the court viewed the defendant’s sweaty, shirtless, 
and “very excited” appearance, as well as his interaction with 
the injured victim (i.e., his “implicit order” that she “answer in 
a certain way so that he would not be taken to jail”) as an 
“indicat[ion] that the ‘elicited statements were necessary to be 
able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to 
learn . . . what had happened in the past.’”48 Thus, in Vinson, 
                                                          
43 Vinson, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7036, at *3. 
44 The record was “somewhat unclear as to exactly when appellant was 
removed from the apartment,” but the court interprets the evidence to suggest 
that the defendant was present when all of the challenged statements were 
made. Id., at *6 n.3. For the possible significance of this observation, see 
infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator presence as 
possibly evolving proxy for emergency). 
45 Id., at **22-24. 
46 Id., at *23. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at *24 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006)) 
TUERKHEIMER 6/22/2007 1:12 AM 
740 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the court was able to find an outlet for the pressure created by a 
doctrinal framework incompatible with the facts presented by a 
typical battering case. 
The opinion in State v. Rodriguez49 similarly reflects what 
may be a willingness on the part of the lower courts to adapt 
Davis to the realities of domestic violence.50 At issue in 
Rodriguez were statements made by a domestic violence victim 
to the police when officers first responded to the scene and on 
the day following that initial interaction. In finding the 
statements describing the past assault to be non-testimonial, the 
court emphasized that the victim was not “motivated by anything 
other than [a] desire to get help and secure safety,” and that her 
“trauma” belied the notion that she had a “conscious 
expectation” that her words would later be used against the 
defendant.51 Statements made to the police the following day 
were also deemed nontestimonial, since the defendant—who, 
unbeknownst to police, was present at the scene at the time of 
the questioning—“was . . . still a severe threat to [the victim’s] 
safety.”52 
Again, it is too soon to forecast with certainty whether, and 
how, lower courts will make workable a framework that cannot 
be meaningfully applied to the facts presented by a typical 
domestic violence case.53 That said, consider the possibility that 
a perpetrator’s presence at the crime scene at the time the 
                                                          
(emphasis in original). Testimony by the deputy that “the scene did not feel 
safe until after appellant had been secured and back-up had arrived” also 
impacted the court’s determination. Id. at *29. 
49 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. App. Ct 2006). 
50 Given the relatively small sample size of written opinions involving 
domestic violence and treating Davis to date, my assessment of how the 
lower courts may be negotiating its defects is necessarily tentative. 
51 Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 148. 
52 Id. After the police left the scene the previous day, the defendant 
returned home and attempted to stab the victim and her child. See id. at 141. 
53 Without specifically identifying the fundamental incoherence of the 
Davis test, one court has observed that “within the context of the fact patterns 
before the Court, the Davis Court crafted some diffuse guidelines which, 
because of the Court’s circumlocution, we must now attempt to distill into 
practical rules.” State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 319 (W. Va. 2006). 
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challenged statements are made might generally become 
accepted as a proxy for an “ongoing emergency,” and the 
perpetrator’s absence from the scene viewed as presumptive 
evidence that a crisis has been resolved.54 Under this rubric, the 
ongoing nature of battering would, to an extent, be 
acknowledged and employed to somewhat mitigate Davis’ 
shortcomings. 
It should be emphasized that any such mitigation would be 
partial: a batterer’s departure from a crime scene (often in 
response to a victim’s call to police) hardly means that the 
danger of imminent harm to the victim has dissipated; absent 
arrest, in many cases, the threat remains real. And yet, lower 
court recognition that “ongoing emergencies” in domestic 
violence cases encompass situations in which⎯notwithstanding 
police presence—a batterer is still on the scene when the victim 
recounts what occurred would represent a significant departure 
from the Supreme Court’s limited understanding of the dynamics 
of domestic abuse. 
If courts manipulate Davis to allow for a more empirically-
based classification of hearsay as testimonial/nontestimonial, 
perhaps the ultimate impact of the decision may be largely 
conceptual. But it would be premature to reach this conclusion. 
Indeed, the Court’s orders granting certiorari, vacating the 
judgment, and remanding cases for further proceedings in Davis’ 
immediate aftermath do not bode well for judicial reasoning 
                                                          
54 Compare, e.g., State v. Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-05-
00785-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7036, at *27 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006) 
(mentioning specifically perpetrator’s presence and behavior as indicating an 
“ongoing and dangerous situation”), with Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 323 
(noting that “the defendant had clearly departed the scene” when the victim 
was questioned, and concluding that the officers’ questioning of the victim 
“was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct”). See also 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 883 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Mass. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (“[B]y the time the officers arrived, although 
the complainant remained upset, the situation had diffused. The testifying 
officer stated that he was informed the assailant was no longer present. 
Nothing in the record indicates that his questioning of the complainant was 
designed to secure the scene.”). 
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predicated on an accurate perception of battering.55 (The 
domestic violence cases that fall into this category resulted in the 
classification of on-scene statements as nontestimonial and 
effectively undermined the notion that an emergency is over 
when the beating ends.56) While many lower courts will continue 
to embrace the false dualisms upon which Davis was erected, in 
all likelihood, an uneasy judicial equilibrium will be reached; 
one which reflects but somewhat moderates the core defects of 
Davis. 
Regardless of how the contortions manifest themselves, the 
“ongoing emergency” framework will continue to distort 
analysis of the threshold definitional question. Moreover, even if 
courts were to adopt the contextualized approach that I have 
suggested, there undoubtedly will be hearsay that is properly 
defined as testimonial.57 Since some theoretical divergence is 
                                                          
55 This type of order is issued only when “intervening developments . . . 
reveal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise 
that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further 
consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may 
determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516 
U.S. 163, 167 (1996). 
56 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL 2093065, at *5 
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 31, 2005) (finding that victim made statements 
“shortly after the incident, while she was crying and frightened, and 
described the beating and the circumstances that immediately led up to it;” 
officer “was responding to a report of a crime and trying to find out what 
had happened and who was responsible”); State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 
305, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that victim, who was “on her way 
to the police station near her house when she encountered [police] . . . 
explained that all of the phone lines at her house had been cut;” because 
“[h]er assailant was still at large, and she was injured,” it was “evident” to 
the court that “she was seeking police protection and assistance”); State v. 
Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005) (mentioning that victim was 
“primarily concerned” about the defendant’s “ability to harm [her] in the 
future, and not with the criminal penalties that he might face for his actions 
that night.”). 
57 It may be that the discrepancy between what an evidentiary code 
requires and what the testimonial approach to confrontation demands has 
grown wider, particularly in the realm of domestic violence prosecution. 
When considering the scope of this discrepancy, it is worth noting the recent 
expansions of hearsay exceptions often used in victimless prosecution. For 
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inevitable—and because, as a practical matter, the wholesale 
judicial rejection of familiar templates seems unlikely—the next 
frontier for the victimless prosecution of domestic violence is 
forfeiture. 
III.  EVOLVING FORFEITURE 
A criminal defendant whose wrongdoing58 has procured the 
absence of his victim at trial59 is deemed to have forfeited his 
right to confrontation.60 This rule—expressly “approved” by the 
Court in both Crawford61 and, more recently in Davis62—
                                                          
instance, California and Oregon have “ad hoc hearsay exceptions directed 
toward domestic violence victims” that allow certain statements of a declarant 
describing the infliction of physical injury or threat of physical injury against 
her provided the statement was made close in time to the incident. Myrna 
Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on 
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK L. REV. 311, 353 
(2005). See also CAL. EVID. CODE. §1370(a)(1) & (3) (West 2001); OR. 
REV. STAT. §40.460(26)(a)(2002). 
58 “Wrongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats, 
but it has also been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant, the 
wrongful nondisclosure of information, and a defendant’s direction to a 
witness to exercise the fifth amendment privilege.” Steele v. Taylor, 684 
F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983). See 
infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text for further discussion of defining 
wrongdoing in the domestic violence context. 
59 See infra note 91 (discussing unavailability analysis meaningfully 
applied to domestic violence cases). 
60 “Some courts speak of the defendant as having waived the 
confrontation right, but this is inaccurate: It is not necessarily so that an 
accused who has acted in the ways described here as knowingly, intelligently, 
and deliberately relinquished the right.” Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation 
and the Definition of Chutzpah, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506 (1997) [hereinafter 
Confrontation]. 
61 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (citing Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)). The Court’s acceptance of the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, and state court forfeiture decisions following 
Crawford, are not without their critics. See, e.g., James P. Flanagan, 
Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by 
Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1193 (2006). 
62 See supra note 12 (noting Davis’ reiteration of the vitality of the 
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”extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds,”63 precluding an accused from “complain[ing] about 
the consequences of his own conduct.”64 A judicial finding of 
forfeiture results in the admission at trial of out-of-court 
statements that would otherwise be excluded pursuant to the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford’s testimonial approach to hearsay⎯and, more 
generally, its “restoration” of the Confrontation Clause 
protection65—instantly creates the prospect of a newly robust 
forfeiture doctrine,66 and provides an impetus for its re-
envisioning.67 As a consequence of the Court’s unequivocal 
                                                          
forfeiture doctrine). 
63 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
64 See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 60, at 516. Richard 
Friedman has stated: 
The proper basis for this principle is not, as some courts have 
suggested it is, the broad dictum that no one should profit by his 
own wrong. As an ideal, that is probably true, but in some cases 
exclusion of the evidence on confrontation grounds will not be 
necessary to guarantee that the accused does not profit by his 
own wrong, and in some cases such exclusion will not be 
sufficient to guarantee that result . . . . A more satisfying 
explanation may be that the accused that should not be heard to 
complain about the consequences of his own conduct. Thus, the 
accused ought not be able to cause exclusion of the secondary 
evidence on the ground that he has been unable to confront and 
examine the declarant when his own conduct accounts for that 
inability.  
Id. 
65 See Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court 
Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 
(2004). 
66 As Myrna Raeder observes, “Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to 
raise claims of forfeiture when facing Confrontation Clause challenges.” 
Raeder, supra note 57, at 361. 
67 In contrast to the abundance of cases treating the testimonial question, 
post-Crawford forfeiture case law is still remarkably undeveloped. In my 
view, the discrepancy is reflective of the practical challenge of recalibrating 
understandings of the bench and prosecutorial bar with respect to how 
constitutional forfeiture applies to domestic violence cases. It also suggests 
that this is a uniquely opportune moment for considered reflection on how 
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“decoupling”68 of the constitutional right from the evidentiary 
code,69 constitutional forfeiture must be given its own doctrinal 
space.70 Indeed, the dramatically changed approach to the 
                                                          
best to effect forfeiture’s normative potential in a new jurisprudential era. 
68 Raeder, supra note 57, at 363. 
69 When considering the introduction of hearsay statements against a 
criminal defendant in a post-Crawford era, it is important to bear in mind 
that, while evidentiary admissibility does not dictate constitutionality, neither 
does constitutional acceptability resolve evidentiary issues. 
70 See Raeder, supra note 57, at 363 (“In my view, we need to separate 
the forfeiture hearsay exception from the constitutional forfeiture doctrine.”). 
Since Davis was decided, a number of courts have reiterated that 
constitutional forfeiture—unlike its evidentiary counterpart (codified at FED. 
R. EVID. 804(b)(6))—does not require specific intent to procure a witness’ 
trial absence. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, No. 2004AP2481-CR, 2007 WL 
543053, at *12-14 (Wis. 2007) (rejecting argument that specific intent 
requirement applies to constitutional forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine); 
People v. Giles, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 1913, at *32 (Cal. 2007) (“[F]orfeiture 
principles can and should logically and equitably be extended to . . . cases in 
which an intent-to-silence element is missing.”). See also State v. Brooks, 
No. W2004-02834-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668, at *26 
(Aug. 31, 2006) (“[U]nlike the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the 
hearsay rule, a defendant’s intent is irrelevant with respect to the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause”); Mechling, 633 
S.E.2d 311, infra note 53. Cf. People v. McClain, No. 6302/02, 2006 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2013, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2006) (holding that the 
rule of forfeiture “simply provides that by killing another, a defendant 
forfeits his or her right to raise a confrontation clause challenge”); People v. 
Jackson, Crim. No. B183306, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7544, at *13 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2006) (“Because [the victim’s] unavailability was 
caused by [the defendant’s] intentional criminal act, [the defendant] cannot be 
heard to complain that he was deprived of the opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine him.”). See also State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842 (N.M. Ct. 
App.), cert. granted, 146 P.3d 809 (N.M. 2006). In Romero, a prosecution 
for murder of the defendant’s former wife, the appellate court noted its 
disagreement with the state Supreme Court precedent holding that proof of 
Confrontation Clause forfeiture requires a showing of a specific intent to 
procure the witness’ absence. The intermediate court remarked, “we suspect 
that our Supreme Court may not have fully considered the pros and cons of 
imposing the intent to silence requirement in all cases involving forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.” Id. at 854. The New Mexico Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari to review the decision and specifically to revisit the boundaries of 
constitutional forfeiture. See State v. Romero, 113 P.3d 346 (N.M. 2005); E-
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Confrontation Clause means that the forfeiture doctrine also 
must be conceptualized anew. 
The need for this reexamination of forfeiture occasioned by 
Crawford is particularly critical in domestic violence cases, 
where the ongoing course of conduct which characterizes 
abusive relationships undermines both evidentiary71 and classic 
constitutional forfeiture analysis.72 Without an appreciation of 
how battering is different from other types of crime, judicial 
decision-making—which tends to default to reason by way of 
precedent and analogy73—will invariably fall short.74 Thus, 
defining the contours of a constitutional forfeiture doctrine with 
meaning in the domestic violence realm requires an evolution in 
judicial reasoning. 
Courts may be beginning to recognize this imperative. For 
instance, in State v. Mechling,75 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court, in remanding a domestic violence conviction for a 
determination on forfeiture grounds, noted that “[a]n accused’s 
coercion or intimidation of a victim of domestic violence so as 
to trigger forfeiture can take many forms,” including pre-charge 
conduct, conduct not specifically directed at procuring trial 
absence, and conduct which can only be understood when 
viewed in context.76 Predicated on an understanding of the 
nature of battering and the ways in which it is distinct from 
other types of crime, the Mechling court’s observations may be 
                                                          
mail from Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, New Mexico Attorney 
General’s Office, to Deborah Tuerkheimer, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Maine School of Law (June 29, 2006, 14:31:00 EST) (on file 
with author). 
71 See Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at Part III.A. 
72 See Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at Part III.B. 
73 Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1314 (1991) (noting that “legal method traditionally 
proceeds by analogy and distinction”). 
74 By “falling short,” I mean that in victimless domestic violence 
prosecutions, the equitable promise of forfeiture will remain largely 
unfulfilled. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting normative 
underpinnings of forfeiture doctrine). 
75 See generally Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 311. 
76 Id. at 326. 
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viewed as an effort to begin to develop a forfeiture doctrine 
grounded in reality. 
For judges to apply the principle of forfeiture faithfully to 
domestic violence cases requires acknowledgment that, as a 
general proposition,77 abuse victims are absent from trials for 
reasons different from those that tend to cause other types of 
witnesses to become unavailable. The divergence of battering 
from a stranger violence template challenges existing 
conceptions of forfeiture in two fundamental ways. First, in 
many battering relationships, abuse occurring prior to the crime 
for which the defendant is being tried causes the victim’s non-
cooperation. Second, what causes a victim to absent herself from 
trial may not be readily identified as “misconduct.” Put 
differently, forfeiture in domestic violence cases raises questions 
of chronology and of how to discern a defendant’s misconduct. 
After elaborating on each inquiry, I will address how forfeiture 
in domestic violence cases might be proven. 
A.  The Problem of Time 
Often, a domestic violence victim’s absence from trial is 
caused by conduct on the part of the defendant that has occurred 
prior to, or even during, the commission of the crime with 
which he is charged.78 Threats to harm, or even kill a woman if 
she ever calls the police or testifies for the prosecution, are used 
as mechanisms of control by countless batterers.79 These threats 
                                                          
77 Asserting that an accurate understanding of the dynamics of battering 
should shape the contours of the forfeiture doctrine is perfectly consistent 
with a commitment to a requirement that, in each particular case, an 
individualized forfeiture determination must be made. See infra note 86 and 
accompanying text. 
78 This dynamic is one of a number of reasons that a requirement that 
the defendant specifically intend to procure a witness’s absence from trial is 
particularly inapt in the domestic violence context. See supra note 66 and 
accompanying text (discussing judicial refusal to import this evidentiary 
construct to constitutional realm). 
79 See Lininger, supra note 4, at 769 (“The reasons why victims refuse 
to cooperate with the prosecution are manifold, but chief among them is the 
risk of reprisals by the batterers. One study found that batterers threaten 
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may be explicit or implicit. They are often leveled against the 
victim’s children and other family members, and they are no 
less real or powerful than the classic witness tamperer’s call 
from jail by virtue of having been announced prior to the crime 
for which the batterer happens to be standing trial. Indeed, it is 
often impossible to isolate the “tampering conduct” from the 
crime itself,80 since the nature of the relationship between a 
batterer and his victim often renders superfluous acts aimed 
specifically at procuring trial absence.81 
We see, then, that the conventional notion that someone who 
witnesses a crime later becomes subject to a defendant’s efforts 
to prevent her testimony is often inapt in the domestic violence 
context; the chronology that comports with reality is not nearly 
so linear. 
B.  The Problem of “What Counts” 
In some cases, of course, the defendant engages in 
misconduct occurring after the charged crime in a manner that 
                                                          
retaliatory violence in as many as half of all cases. . . .” (citing Randall 
Fritzier & Lenore Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in 
the Trenches, 37 FAM. CT. REV. 28, 33 (2000), available at 
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.html)). 
80 The discussion that follows tends to support the proposition that 
existing criminal law definitions of domestic violence fail to capture the full 
spectrum of battering conduct. See generally Tuerkheimer, Remedying the 
Harm of Battering, supra note 1. 
81 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. While it is often impossible 
to identify a “tampering” behavior that is distinct from an abusive course of 
conduct (even as a theoretical matter), this is not always the case. Many 
batterers engage in efforts specifically targeted at procuring the unavailability 
of the victim at trial—for instance, threatening to kill her if she cooperates 
with prosecutorial efforts. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 807 
(Minn. 2005) (mentioning defendant who menaced girlfriend with gun made 
calls from jail threatening that “if she doesn’t do what he wants someone will 
come over to her house and do something to her”). Even when a batterer 
behaves in ways that correspond more closely to traditional understandings of 
“tampering,” however, his actions are embedded in a relationship 
characterized by the violent exercise of power. 
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causes the victim’s unavailability.82 Yet here, too, the difficulty 
of importing the “tampering” construct to the domestic violence 
context—where the significance of a particular act is deeply 
embedded in a relationship—becomes readily apparent. 
In marked contrast to the archetypical tampering case, where 
courts have little trouble seeing the likely effect of a murder 
defendant’s call from jail threatening to kill a witness if she 
testifies, the meaning ascribed by a domestic violence victim to 
conduct by her abuser can rarely be understood or evaluated 
without reference to the abusive relationship.83 
This tension relates to a concern articulated by the lower 
court in Hammon: 
The question will probably also frequently arise as to 
what amounts to “wrongdoing” by a defendant in 
such a scenario, i.e., will only physical 
“wrongdoing” (another battery) by a defendant 
suffice, or can psychological pressure on a victim not 
to cooperate be enough, and if so, how is such 
pressure to be measured?84 
This question cannot be answered in the abstract, and the 
fact-dependent nature of the inquiry can hardly be overstated. 
                                                          
82 Here, the question of what “misconduct” constitutes a forfeiture of 
confrontation rights is put in starkest relief, although the inquiry is relevant 
regardless of when the (mis)conduct which caused the victim’s absence 
occurred in relation to the charged crime. 
83 “[R]elationship provides the terrain on which a batterer’s system of 
domination is enacted; relationship is essential to grasping the full measure of 
harm inflicted by the abuser and suffered by the victim; relationship connects 
and organizes what might otherwise appear to be random acts.” Tuerkheimer, 
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 1, at 973-74. See Karla Fischer 
et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 46 SMU. L. REV. 2117, 2120 (1993) (“In battering 
relationships . . . cultural components become an extension of the pattern of 
domination itself . . . . A gesture that seems innocent to an observer is 
instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of abuse. It is a 
threat that carries weight because similar threats with their corresponding 
consequences have been carried out before, perhaps many times.”). 
84 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. App. 2004), 
vacated, 829 N.E.2d 444 (2005). 
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With regard to the reasoning process itself (as opposed to its 
outcome), however, it may be said that without an appreciation 
of the importance of context, and a sense of the patterned nature 
of battering, judicial forfeiture decisions will be unduly 
restrictive. Unless the dynamics of abuse are taken into account, 
the principle of forfeiture cannot be faithfully applied to 
domestic violence cases. Insight into the nature of battering is 
thus essential for the equitable underpinnings of the rule to be 
realized. 
C.  Proving Forfeiture 
Accepting that in many, if not most, victimless domestic 
violence prosecutions a batterer’s conduct over time has caused 
the victim’s unavailability does not answer the question of how 
judges are to determine whether a particular defendant has 
forfeited his constitutional rights.85 One fundamental requirement 
is an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution has the burden 
of proving that the defendant’s misconduct caused the victim’s 
unavailability.86 In my prosecutorial experience, many victims 
                                                          
85 Cf. Raeder, supra note 57, at 361 (“Some prosecutors are already 
arguing that domestic violence cases by their very nature involve forfeiture 
when the victim does not testify. They claim defendants invariably either 
actually threatened complainants or, given the circumstances of their 
relationships, such women are afraid that their testimony will cause further 
violence (emphasis added).”). Apropos of a concern that domestic violence 
victims’ statements will be categorically immune from Confrontation Clause 
challenge, Tom Lininger has aptly observed that “not every [domestic 
violence] assault carries with it the threat of reprisals if the victim cooperates 
with law enforcement. If courts were to presume such tampering in every 
domestic violence case, the forfeiture exception would swallow the rule of 
confrontation.” Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There is a Confrontation 
Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 407 (2005). 
86 Importantly, “forfeiture cannot be assumed without specific evidence 
linking a defendant to a complainant’s failure to testify at trial.” Raeder, 
supra note 57, at 361. “Specific evidence,” in my view, contemplates proof 
of how the particular defendant on trial, by his battering conduct, caused the 
victim’s unavailability. This requisite linkage should go some way to 
alleviating fears that forfeiture will be too radically expanded by a categorical 
domestic violence exception to the default requirement of confrontation. 
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are, at some point in the process, quite candid about their 
reasons for wishing charges to be “dropped”; their hearsay 
statements are generally admissible at a forfeiture hearing.87 
Other evidence might include orders of protection, family court 
petitions and transcripts, prior police reports, and expert 
testimony on the effects of battering.88 
In many victimless prosecutions, provided an accurate 
judicial conception of what may constitute forfeiture, the burden 
of proving that the defendant’s misconduct procured the 
complainant’s trial absence will be satisfied.89 Yet Crawford and 
its progeny present domestic violence prosecutors with a difficult 
dilemma: in order to successfully advance a forfeiture argument, 
extreme measures to procure the victim’s trial attendance may 
be required.90 As understandings of forfeiture in the battering 
realm evolve, the law regarding witness unavailability may 
concomitantly develop in a manner that accounts for the 
particularities of domestic violence.91 But in the meantime, in 
                                                          
87 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (in making a determination regarding questions 
of admissibility, the court “is not bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges.”). 
88 See Adam M. Krischer, “Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not 
Stupid”: Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, 
38 PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (2004) (describing various other ways of proving a 
batterer’s responsibility for procuring victim unavailability, including prison 
phone records, jailhouse phone recordings, voicemail messages, e-mail, and 
eyewitnesses to threats). 
89 Even so, as litigation strategies shift in the wake of Davis, the 
prosecutorial resources which will be expended to prove forfeiture should not 
be underestimated. See Raeder, supra note 57, at 364-65 (discussing costs 
associated with proving forfeiture, and questioning “whether such resources 
would be available for misdemeanors, which encompass a large percentage of 
the domestic violence caseload”). 
90 Again, a judicial determination that a defendant forfeited his right of 
confrontation requires a finding of witness unavailability. See supra note 59 
and accompanying text. 
91 Without purporting to resolve the issue, it is worth observing that 
what “reasonableness” requires in the domestic violence context may be 
distinct. More specifically, the “reasonableness” of prosecutorial efforts to 
secure the trial participation of a domestic violence victim may be partly 
dependent on whether the dynamics of battering warrant any degree of 
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many victimless prosecutions, these necessary measures to 
procure a victim’s presence at trial will be undertaken⎯often 
reluctantly, and often unsuccessfully⎯forcing judges to apply an 
equitable doctrine to conduct that is in essence different from 
crimes that occupy a more historically privileged, less equivocal 
place in our criminal justice system.92 
A meaningful rule of forfeiture contemplates these 
distinguishing features and acknowledges their incompatibility 
with the traditional forfeiture framework, contesting law’s 
systemic inattention to relationship.93 Application of forfeiture 
principles to domestic violence thus requires no radical 
reworking of doctrinal foundations. Rather, the potential for a 
reasoned forfeiture analysis lies in enhanced judicial 
understanding of the underlying facts and a willingness to accept 
the obsolescence of conventional witness tampering paradigms. 
                                                          
deference to the victim’s expression of non-cooperation. Must a prosecutor 
subpoena a victim for trial in order to satisfy the “unavailability” prong of 
forfeiture analysis? If a victim fails to appear in response to a subpoena, must 
she be arrested and brought to court? Must a subpoenaed victim be arrested 
in anticipation of her testimony? These questions are not simply academic: 
after Crawford, prosecutors are increasingly relying on material witness 
warrants to ensure the availability of victims at trial. See Lininger, 
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, supra note 4, at 1365 n. 70. Whether 
the “unavailability” component of the Confrontation Clause analysis should 
be analyzed differently in domestic violence cases is a question with which 
courts and commentators will likely grapple for some time. 
92 See supra note 1; Tuerkheimer, Remedying the Harm of Battering, 
supra note 1, at 969-71. 
93 For a forfeiture analysis that reflects judicial awareness of these 
dynamics, see People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. April 7, 2003). With the sole exception of Santiago (which was 
decided before Crawford), I have found no written opinion in a domestic 
violence case that conceptualizes forfeiture in the manner that I am 
advocating. 
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IV.  A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT 
AND ITS LOSS 
The approach to confrontation that this Article has described 
may best be characterized as “relational.”94 As a method of 
analyzing what the right of confrontation entails, the relational 
question is critical in prosecutions involving domestic violence. 
When engaging in the threshold “testimonial” inquiry, taking 
into account the dynamics of domestic abuse challenges 
conventional notions of exigency derived from and related to 
paradigmatic crime between strangers. Consideration of the 
relational question yields a similar reconfiguration of doctrinal 
parameters in the forfeiture area, where precedent and analogy 
are inadequate to the task of implementing the equitable 
principles underlying the rule. A relational view of forfeiture 
requires contemplation of the connection between the defendant 
and victim when determining whether the defendant’s 
misconduct caused the victim’s unavailability at trial. Attending 
to the context of the relationship essential to battering thus 
impacts how the confrontation right is operationalized, a matter 
of great import to the future prosecution of domestic violence. 
More broadly, a relational approach also may influence how 
we view the meaning of the confrontation right. By synthesizing 
my critiques of the “testimonial” inquiry and of the forfeiture 
doctrine, an understanding of the right that is itself relational in 
nature emerges. In conclusion, I offer an outline of the 
normative implications of this argument. 
The meaning of confrontation is largely dependent on the 
configuration of relationships between the accuser, state, and 
accused—a variable scarcely noticed by courts or commentators. 
Theories of confrontation do not remark on this triangle 
(accused-accuser-state), which implicitly frames the conceptual 
analysis. Rather, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and 
scholarship tend to presume particular alliances: accuser with 
state against accused. 
                                                          
94 See supra note 8 (qualifying use of “relational”). 
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We can see how integral this default arrangement is to the 
“paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation” suffered by Sir 
Walter Raleigh.95 In the case against Raleigh, the relationship 
between the state and accuser was such that the prosecution 
could very well have produced Lord Cobham, the quintessential 
accuser, to testify. Tacitly invoking this alliance, Raleigh 
argued, “[I]t is strange to see how you press me still with my 
Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him . . . . He is in the 
house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be 
produced . . .”96 
In prosecutions for paradigmatic crime, the relational triangle 
may be generally characterized in this manner: the accuser is “in 
the house hard by;” or aligned with the state against the 
accused. In the victimless domestic violence realm, however, the 
same cannot be said. Indeed, quite the opposite is true: in most 
cases where the prosecution is proceeding without a victim,97 
allegiances underlying the relational triad are essentially 
inverted; the accuser is metaphorically, and often physically, in 
the house with the accused. This inversion has real consequences 
for the functioning of the confrontation right. 
Fundamentally, what it means to be an “accuser”98 may be 
                                                          
95 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (noting that the 
Confrontation Clause “was directed [at] . . . notorious treason cases like 
Raleigh’s;” “Raleigh’s trial has long been thought a paradigmatic 
confrontation violation.”). 
96 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1832). In the alternative: 
JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 157-58 (1850). 
97 In the vast majority of victimless prosecutions, it is the preferences of 
domestic violence victims, as opposed to the strategic maneuvering of 
prosecutors, that drive this aspect of prosecutorial decision-making. See supra 
note 4 (noting high percentage of uncooperative domestic violence victims). 
98 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). Cf. Robert 
P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 n. 18 (2005). 
Robert Mosteller observes: 
Somewhat inexplicably, in my judgment, one aspect that 
[Crawford’s] historical treatment and preliminary definition 
leaves out is my particular focus on accusers and accusatory 
statements, as opposed to testimonial statements. I believe there 
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different when the witness is a victim of domestic violence as 
inquiry into the “testimonial” nature of a statement shows. 
Consistent with the conventional model of crime—which also 
seems to resonate with the Crawford majority99—the providing 
of information regarding past criminal conduct to law 
enforcement transforms a victim/witness into an accuser. By 
participating in an effort to apprehend (and, therefore, 
prosecute) the perpetrator, she has allied herself with the state, 
thus triggering attendant obligations under the Confrontation 
Clause.100 
                                                          
should be a role for the concept of ‘accusatory’ hearsay in the 
analysis because it better describes the core concern of the 
Confrontation Clause than does the testimonial concept . . . . On 
the other hand, I recognize that the decisional moment has been 
reached and that, despite my arguments, the concept of 
testimonial statements, rather than accusatory hearsay or 
accusatory statements, has been the dominant paradigm. 
Moreover, if testimonial is defined using the amicus definition in 
Crawford and, appropriately interpreted, it will include most 
accusatory hearsay. (citation omitted) Thus, I focus on 
testimonial statements. Nevertheless, I believe the concept of 
accusatory statements is quite useful in helping to identify those 
statements that should be identified as testimonial. 
Id. 
99 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who 
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, 
like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus 
reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court 
statement.”). 
100 In support of his position that the conduct of the declarant, as 
opposed to the participation of a government agent, renders a statement 
testimonial, Richard Friedman has made the following helpful observation: 
If . . . the source of the information is a human who does 
understand its likely use, we can say that she was playing a 
conscious, knowing role in the criminal justice system, 
providing information with the anticipation that it would be used 
in prosecution - and that certainly sounds a lot like testifying. 
Furthermore, without such understanding on the part of the 
declarant, the situation lacks the moral component allowing the 
judicial system to say in effect, “You have provided information 
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In most domestic violence cases, as we have seen, no such 
alliance inheres in a victim’s invocation of the law enforcement 
apparatus. Viewed narrowly, a battered woman who recounts a 
criminal incident to police may be considered an “accuser”; but 
her actions have a different meaning when seen in context. 
Classifying this type of hearsay as nontestimonial reflects 
awareness that a domestic violence victim has not permanently 
shifted her allegiance from the defendant by asking for police 
protection and, accordingly, that she is not an “accuser” in the 
Confrontation Clause sense of the word. 
A similar theoretical claim may be articulated with respect to 
a reconceived forfeiture doctrine. The contextualized judicial 
determination that I have urged asks whether the alliances 
underlying the conventional relational triad have been inverted 
and, if so, whether the defendant’s battering behavior is causal 
in the shift. If so, he may not assert a Confrontation Clause 
challenge; the default mandate of state production of the 
“accuser” makes little sense where the accused’s own 
misbehavior is responsible for perverting the paradigmatic 
relational structure. 
Crawford teaches that confrontation has a function beyond 
ensuring the reliability of evidence.101 While theoretical 
perspectives on the value of the right are varied,102 I contend 
that the identification of a relational triangle has implications 
across the conceptual spectrum, enhancing our understanding of 
how best to advance whatever the chosen norm. Across 
                                                          
with the knowledge that it may help convict a person. If that is 
to happen, our system imposes upon you the obligation of taking 
an oath, saying what you have to say in the presence of the 
accused, and answering questions put to you on his behalf.” 
Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2005). 
101 See Crawford, 546 U.S. at 61. 
102 See Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at 59-61 
(summarizing various normative perspectives on the right of confrontation, 
including the individual dignity theory, the “accuser/obligation” approach, 
the limited government model, and a utilitarian “truth seeking” understanding 
of the right.). 
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theoretical orientations, a relational perspective speaks to what 
implementation of the confrontation right requires.103 
CONCLUSION 
The departure of domestic violence from a traditional crime 
archetype shows that a particular vision of relationships has, 
until now, animated our sense of what the Constitution requires. 
Toward the end of discerning whether confrontation furthers its 
intended normative purpose, a relational inquiry reveals that the 
meaning of “absent accuser” is distinct in the battering context. 
Similarly, a relational approach to forfeiture contemplates 
whether, by his battering behavior, a defendant has reconfigured 
the conventional alignment of the accused-accuser-state triad. By 
exposing a conceptual triangle that frames Confrontation Clause 
challenges, the relational insight thus advances our 
understanding of the confrontation right and how its promise 
may best be realized. 
                                                          
103 For application of this argument to competing visions of the function 
of confrontation, see id. 
